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Introduction
In December of 2015, the Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT) signed a
surprising resolution agreeing to buy the homes of a historicallyblack and extremely polluted
neighborhood to protect the residents from any further environmental damage that would be
caused by the relocation of a bridge into their neighborhood. Not only was the relocation benefit
three times higher than the market value was and what is required by federal law, but the
resolution came in near record time, only a few months after the community filed a civil rights
complaint with the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) claiming that the proposed
rerouting of the bridge was in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The route
chosen by TxDOT would run adjacent to the Hillcrest neighborhood, cutting them off from the
rest of the Northside community and City of Corpus Christi residents, pushing them into the
industrial and much more polluted side of town.1
Hillcrest residents had been subjected to environmental hazards for decades, including
their close proximity to several oil refineries and two freeways which boxed them in on three
sides. If the bridge project were accepted by the federal government, Hillcrest would be
completely surrounded by industry. Routine chemical leaks and explosions increased the
environmental burden on the community, resulting in disproportionately high rates of cancer,
birth defects, and respiratory problems among residents. So, when TxDOT released their Draft
Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) in December of 2013 recommending the replacement
and relocation into Hillcrest of the aging US181 Harbor Bridge, an idea that had been in the
works and opposed by the local neighborhood association for a decade, legal help stepped in to
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represent the community in an ultimately successful attempt to finally hold Texas and the federal
government accountable for their actions.

Since the boom in freeway construction across America following World War II,
lowincome communities and communities of color have been continually targeted in the
locations chosen for new freeways. Often, these freeways cut right through neighborhoods,
separating vibrant communities or disconnecting residents from business districts. Worse,
freeway projects regularly displace hundreds of residents from their homes, leaving former
residents with a market rate payout insufficient to attain housing in most other areas of the city.
The construction of new freeway can take decades, and the noise and air pollution can cause
significant health problems. And when the freeway is finally completed, the surrounding
neighborhoods are subjected to high levels of exhaust, often higher than health professionals
deem safe for any population. As Robert D. Bullard says in his book Highway Robbery:
Transportation Racism & New Routes to Equity, freeways “physically isolate residents from their
institutions and businesses, disrupt oncestable communities, displace thriving businesses,
contribute to urban sprawl, subsidize infrastructure decline, create traffic gridlock, and subject
residents to elevated risks from accidents, spills, and explosions from vehicles carrying
hazardous chemicals and other dangerous materials.”2
While developers often turn to the excuse of “ideal location” as justification for locating
freeways in minority communities, there are several reasons why these communities are
consistently asked to bear the burden of community destruction caused by freeways. The most
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prominent is the idea the “path of least resistance,” which explains that affluent communities are
more capable of fighting off such projects, leaving the undesirable additions to minority and
lowincome communities.3 In many cases, this means developers target “communit[ies] with
weak social, economic, and political capital.”4 Wealthier communities organize against these
projects, and project managers are unlikely to consider bisecting affluent areas of cities with
freeways. Lowincome residents have lower levels of political engagement and resources, are
less likely to be able to take time off work or spend their free time speaking at community
meetings or submitting public comment. Additionally, inconvenientlyscheduled meetings,
language barriers, or fears surrounding legal status might prevent workingclass or minority
residents from attending community forums to voice their opinion.
Further, if eminent domain is used to acquire property and clear land for construction, the
historicallylow property values of lowincome and minority neighborhoods are appealing to
states. Jim Crowera housing legislation and redlining categorized neighborhood quality based
on race, allowing for the quick identification of target neighborhoods today.5 The urban renewal
movement in the mid 20th century was premised on the assumption that lowincome
neighborhoods needed revitalization, but in practice, it forced residents of entire neighborhoods
to find housing elsewhere. In a 1963 interview, James Baldwin critiqued urban renewal, calling it
“negro removal,” an act the federal government was not only aware of, but an “accomplice” in
executing.6 Not only could minority displacement and exploitation be explained by the path of
least resistance, but it could be justified in the name of progress.
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Groups resisting freeway construction projects on environmental justice grounds face real
challenges, and they are usually unsuccessful. Yet communities like Hillcrest have succeeded in
their efforts. What led to this success? What factors allowed Hillcrest to succeed in receiving
substantial relocation allowances when most other civil rights complaints or lawsuits result in
apathy or inaction by government agencies? Why are some movements successful while others
are not, and what can be learned from the successes and failures of past community movements?
Methodology
In this paper, I discuss the characteristics of freeway project proposals and subsequent
opposition movements to identify the primary factors leading to the success or failure of the
resistance. I selected three case studies to research in depth – Harbor Bridge, discussed above,
the Central 70 Project in Denver, and the South Mountain Freeway Project in Phoenix – in search
of patterns or trends that might suggest a way to anticipate the outcomes of other freeway
resistance movements.
I set a series of parameters at the beginning of my case selection process to help narrow
the case options available to me. The first parameter was based on timing: I needed projects that
had released their first environmental impact reports after 1994, the year President Clinton
signed Executive Order 12898 requiring all federal agencies to consider environmental justice in
their proceedings. This helped by narrowing my analysis to projects in which agencies, planners,
and developers were mandated to address environmental justice concerns throughout the
project’s process. Also concerning timing, I relied on cases that were resolved in one way or
another–this meant I had to look past several highprofile and otherwise perfect freeway disputes
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that were still in their planning stages or had lawsuits pending. In doing so I was left to focus my
efforts on cases where the inputs could be evaluated alongside the outcome.
I also considered the availability of online documentation of a project and resistance
efforts, which ended up being one of the most prominent constraints on which projects I was able
to choose. Unless projects were suggested and explained in interviews, sparse news coverage,
convoluted community websites, and contradicting reports made digging for information that
was readily available for other projects an unwise use of limited time. The first two cases I
chose–Central 70 and Harbor Bridge–were brought up in nearly every interview and information
was readily available online about each. However, finding the third case study was challenging.
The South Mountain Freeway Project was suggested in one of the first interviews I conducted,
and it seemed to fit the criteria I set for Harbor Bridge and Central 70, but it soon became clear
that local news coverage, state DOT documents, and consistent information were significantly
harder to find than with the other two cases. The Arizona DOT (ADOT) website was down
multiple times for days at a time, “news” articles often had project interest groups on their
bylines, and the responses I received to my inquiries from ADOT were often default messages
with no followup. My request for the state’s response to a civil rights complaint (information
that should be accessible without this bureaucratic hassle) was met first with a automatic reply
form to pursue a Public Records Request, and then with a community relations project manager
who has since stopped responding. Those I did speak to about the project (Sandy Bahr of the
Sierra Club and Pat Lawlis of Protecting Arizona’s Resources and Children) were incredibly
helpful and I would not have the same understanding of the project without them. Given my
relatively short time frame, I did choose to continue research on South Mountain, even after
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learning of this challenge. While there was less accessibility to the information I needed, the
barricading of public information indicates the priorities of the agency, a factor I took into
consideration when evaluating the outcome of this Arizona freeway.
In any future research, I may select to replace the case of South Mountain with a project
whose characteristics more closely resemble those of Harbor Bridge and Central 70, but for this
paper, I feel that the inclusion of South Mountain provides a glance into the diversity of state and
federal agencies running transportation decisions across the country.
Policy Background
One of the most important laws bearing on decisionmaking about highway projects is
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), created to ensure that federal agencies
considered environmental impacts in planning for new developments. NEPA requires agencies to
file Environmental Impact Statements (EISs) with each project proposal that might bring about
any type of environmental impact. The work of filing and receiving approval on these reports is
referred to as the “NEPA process,” and is often timeconsuming and delays projects. After
determining if a project poses any risks to the environment, the first step is for an agency (these
“lead agencies” include state DOTs) to prepare an EIS which discusses any environmental
impacts of the project, as well as proposes and considers alternatives. The first draft of an EIS (a
DEIS) is submitted to the EPA for review and to the Federal Register opening it for public
comment for at least 45 days. With comments from the public as well as the EPA and other
federal agencies, the lead agency responds, makes changes, and publishes a Final EIS (FEIS).
Another comment period follows, and after thirty days, they publish a Record of Decision
(ROD), which “explains the agency's decision, describes the alternatives the agency considered,
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and discusses the agency's plans for mitigation and monitoring, if necessary.”7 It wasn't until
decades after NEPA’s 1969 signing, however, that the NEPA process was forced to consider
environmental justice.
In 1994, President Clinton signed Executive Order 12898, called “Federal Actions to
Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and LowIncome Populations,” which
mandated the consideration of environmental justice into the actions of any federal agency. The
order called for each agency to create their own agencywide plan to address environmental
justice, and in this way, environmental justice measures were incorporated into the NEPA
process.8 This order reinforced countless previouslypassed laws and regulations, and upheld
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VI”) which prohibits any kind of discrimination
in a federallyfunded program.9 But since the EO was not enforceable, it acted more as a
symbolic federal acknowledgement of the environmental justice movement. For activists taking a
legal route of resistance against projects, using Title VI for their case is a popular option.
Literature Review
“Environmental justice” is defined by the US Environmental Protection Agency as “the
fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless of race, color, national origin,
or income, with respect to the development, implementation, and enforcement of environmental
laws, regulations, and policies.”10 The contemporary environmental justice movement is thought
to have started in North Carolina in 1982 when an African American county decided to protest
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the government bureaucrats who planned to relocate contaminated soil into their community.11
Yet the environmental justice movement has not fully joined the mainstream environmental
movement, which has been criticized by environmental justice advocates for whitewashing
environmental issues. This distinction between environmental justice and environmentalism is
apparent throughout my case studies and can be seen as the difference between environmental
justice protests which “clearly focus on the eventual outcome and the idea that hazards should be
fairly, equitably, and justly distributed, regardless of race or class,” and the NIMBY movement
“which epitomizes the principles behind the ‘path of least resistance.’”12
I chose to research environmental justice through the lens of modern freeway
construction projects because the field is relatively untouched. The United States is also at a
unique time politically, with a federal administration taking a stronger stance against
environmental justice than presidents have since the term was introduced politically by Clinton
in 1994. Under the current administration, “the EPA has begun to walk back already anemic
federal environmentaljustice work, putting a stop to some civilrights investigations and
replacing or firing many of the scientists with deep technical knowledge of the subject.”13
While transportation equity and antifreeway activism have been studied extensively on
their own, there is little existing research on the two fields in relation to one another, specifically
covering activism efforts against environmental injustice. The scholars in these fields have all
contributed to my understanding of the issues, as well as left me with the questions which inform
this research. Highway Robbery: Transportation Racism & New Routes to Equity, edited by
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Raymond A. Mohl and other key scholars in the field of transportation and environmental
justice, discusses the ways in which transportation is racialized. Most chapters focus on public
transit, discussing resistance movements to public transit inequities (the book itself is dedicated:
“To Homer Plessy, Rosa Parks, and Freedom Riders worldwide”14) and it doesn't spend much
time on resistance to freeway projects. Despite this, Mohl is one of the only scholars who
discussed the fundamentals to resisting freeway construction projects.
In 2004, Mohl published “Stop the Road: Freeway Revolts in American Cities” which
outlined the commonalities between successful freeway revolts in the 1950s70s. First,
movements needed “neighborhood activism” with “committed local leaders”; second, it was
necessary to have support from “local politicians and from influential newspapers and
journalists”; third, movements within cities with “strong and historic planning traditions, such as
San Francisco” were more likely to find success; fourth, movements needed “legal action”; and
fifth, success would only come with “a final shutdown decision from the courts” or “highest
levels of the highway bureaucracy.”15 Mohl states that a grassroots movement was another
important factor to a successful revolt, but “without these other ingredients, there was a very
good chance that the freeway would get built anyway.”16
However, in all of his thirtythree pages on freeway revolts in the mid 20th century, the
terms “Civil Rights Act,” “Title VI,” “environmental justice,” “Executive Order 12898” (in any
of its titled forms), and “minority”/“Latino”/“Hispanic”/“Mexican” appear zero times. Mohl does
spend some time discussing race in terms of the black communities that chose to resist freeway
projects in their neighborhoods, but he only briefly touched on the intricacies of power relations
14
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that are fundamentally different between white and minority opposition movements. Beyond this
gap, I found that many more recent community freeway resistance movements strayed from his
framework enough to demand a reevaluation. While Mohl’s paper did the work of describing
certain revolts of the past, I wanted to understand what activists could do to improve their
chances of success going forward. This paper in part works to update Mohl’s argument, using
modern cases and taking into consideration how and why any formal institutions that have arisen
since the revolts in Mohl’s piece have changed the dynamics of conflict around freeway projects.
Transportation infrastructure also turned out to be an excellent lens through which to look
at environmental justice. There is legislation in place that should prevent or at least draw
significant attention to environmental justice, yet new freeways are still being proposed which
continue to commit the same environmental injustices as decades past. With grassroots
opposition as a primary form of resistance, I was curious what tools were available to activists,
and among these, which were most successful in ensuring success of the movement. I also
wondered what accounted for the difference in outcomes of the resistance movements, why some
community movements are successful in stopping a project or securing adequate mitigation
measures while others are not. Is this difference in outcomes due to actions by the activists,
factors out of their control, or a combination of both? And what can be learned from these
successes and failures that can help inform future community antifreeway efforts?
Drawing on Charles Tilly’s framework for collective action, I analyze the
organization of each resistance group and opportunities open to those groups. Using these
three cases and nearly a dozen phone interviews with experts in the field, I found that while
the aspects of a group’s organization are important in determining the outcome, the
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political opportunity available to a group–specifically the attitudes and priorities of the
decisionmaking agency–is most critical to the success of a movement.

Significant Factors
Charles Tilly introduced a framework for understanding collective action, or “people’s
acting together in pursuit of common interests,” in his 1978 book From Mobilization to
Revolution.17 While his analysis includes five components of a movement (interest, organization,
mobilization, opportunity, and collective action itself), I found that organization and opportunity
in particular work to explain the outcomes collective action against a freeway proposal.
Organization Timing

Did signs of opposition develop early, perhaps even before the NEPA process formally
began?
Did legal help join in support of the community early?
Was there a strong sense of community within the affected area before the project was
formally proposed?

Cohesion

Did the opposition movement collectively represent a singular interest or perspective?
Did the opposition movement effectively represent varying perspectives while
maintaining the appearance of cohesion?

Opportunity

17

Project
Framing

Was the state DOT unable to frame the project as helping the community?

Local
Context

Was there a clear history of environmental injustice in the affected area?

State and
Federal
Priorities

Was the federal administration at the time of resistance conscious of environmental
justice issues?

Were there reasonable and feasible project alternatives whose dismissal from
consideration could be disputed?

Were local politicians, businesses, or socialites on their side?

Was the federal agency/entity responsible for an investigation conscious of
environmental justice issues?

Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution, 1978: 7.
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The organization of a movement focuses on the actions within the control of the group.
As Tilly writes, “clearly one of the problems is to determine which features of an organization do
make a difference.”18 The timing of efforts and group cohesion stand out as important aspects of
group organization contributing to the outcome of an opposition movement. Timing is important
since early involvement is one of the best indicators of success. Waiting to organize until the
NEPA process has formally begun is often too late, because by then developers are usually more
invested in their plans making them harder to block. Similarly, the cohesion and structure of the
opposition is critical to the outcome of the effort. Splinter groups and the lack of strong
leadership to ameliorate local conflicts and communicate demands can weaken the oppositional
effort. In short, too many conflicting perspectives detract from others viewing the opposition
movement as an organized, cohesive voice and eliminates the possibility of a power in numbers.
While organization includes factors mostly in the control of the community, opportunity
focuses on things beyond the control of the communities: the political, social, and economic
context surrounding the community group, and “the relationship between a group and the world
around it.”19 One of these is the design of the freeway project and the way it is framed by the
state DOT. A project might be framed as a community revitalization project, making it harder for
a community to argue is actually hurting them. The context of the local community, including
their history with environmental injustice and any publicity or allyship which appears, also
affects the outcome. A neighborhood with a history of environmental hazards is able to claim
that a freeway project would contribute to past trends, which is harder for developers to justify
than a singular environmental justice event. Context also refers to local attitudes towards the

18
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project, and whether local politicians or other influential figures have stated their opinions about
the project. Whether these individuals bring financial, political, or social power, local icons can
have significant sway in the outcome of the resistance. Finally, the state and federal priorities
(represented in the state DOT, state representatives, and the federal government) not only have
significant authority over the project’s design/framing, but can expose priorities that help predict
the outcome of resistance. Title VI complaints, for example, are filed with FHWA who has the
power to dismiss or accept a complaint, and then to determine the findings of any investigation if
accepted. Title VI complaints cannot be taken to court, and thus their decisions cannot be
appealed, lending significant say in the outcome of complaints to a federal agency, one of the
main avenues taken by environmental justice activists.20
In the next section, I will give background to the three cases and apply this framework to
each, to ultimately make a claim for the factors most significant to the outcome of a movement.

Harbor Bridge
I use the case of Harbor Bridge in Corpus Christi, Texas as a case study of successful
opposition. The features of the organization were well coordinated and the political opportunity
was wide open when the group needed it.
Background. The Harbor Bridge proposal wasn't the first environmental injustice
Hillcrest or the rest of the Northside community had suffered: the nearby Port of Corpus Christi
brought in many sources of pollution, making Corpus Christi home to the highest concentration
of oil refineries with nearby residents in the United States,21 and the two freeways built through
the city all contributed to the industrialization of the onceresidential area.

20
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In December of 2013, TxDOT submitted a DEIS for the Harbor Bridge relocation
project, opening the plan up to public comment and federal agency review. The Obama EPA,
which proved more open to environmental justice concerns than previous administrations,22 and
other federal agencies responded with specific concerns about air, soil, and noise pollution, the
impact the project would have on property values, and the mitigation measures proposed.23
TxDOT revised and published their final EIS in November of 2014, which again the EPA and
public critiqued, this time for TxDOT’s faulty use of environmental health and demographic
statistics in their EIS–instead of using the specific numbers associated with Hillcrest, TxDOT
used regional stats which painted a far less severe portrait of Hillcrest than was accurate. In
certain areas, the pollution in Hillcrest was four times as intense as the numbers used from the
county as a whole.24 The “affected population” was stated in the EIS as being 4.3% African
American, accurate for the city of Corpus Christi, but looking at the Hillcrest and Washington
Coles neighborhoods, the numbers rise to around 35% African American. For the determination
of “minority” percentage in the project area, Corpus Christi was cited at 66.7%, but had the
reviewers focused on the Hillcrest and Washington Coles neighborhoods as would have been
appropriate the percentages would have been reported as 93% and 94% respectively.25 Because
environmental justice legislation is dependent on the demographic makeup of a community,
these differences changed the way developers were required to frame their outreach and consider
community concerns, ultimately making it easier for the project to succeed.

22

Yehle 2011.
TamezRobledo, “EPA: Harbor Bridge study underplays potential Northside impact.” 2015.
24
TamezRobledo, “EPA: Harbor Bridge study underplays potential Northside impact.” 2015.
25
Gaines and Haragan, “Complaint Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.” 2015. 6.
23

Wampler 15

In March of 2015, soon after the release of the FEIS, two Hillcrest residents represented
by Texas RioGrande Legal Aid, Inc. filed a civil rights complaint with FHWA. The formal
complaint made the case that beyond these statistical oversights, TxDOT was in violation of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 on the basis of “disparate impacts suffered by the Hillcrest and
Washington Coles neighborhoods,” “inadequate public participation,” and “perpetuation of past
discrimination.”26 In response, FHWA assigned an investigator to the case, who quickly
facilitated an agreement between TxDOT and FHWA, allowing TxDOT to proceed with their
project while also taking into account the specifications of the complaint. In nearly record time,
TxDOT agreed to address the complainants’ concerns by offering exceptionally high payouts to a
voluntary resident relocation program. If they chose to go, Hillcrest homeowners would be given
three times above market rate payout for their homes, and tenants would be offered subsidized
rent for three and a half years.27 For those residents wanting to stay, an agreement on air quality
mitigation measures was made. This case is seen as a incredible success, and the next section
will unpack the aspects of the mobilization’s organization and opportunity which lended
themselves to the outcome.
Analysis. Organizationally, the timing and cohesion of the movement ensured their
success. Longterm opposition to decades of pollution in the community meant that forces
fighting for environmental justice were already in place. RioGrande Legal Aid, Inc. had
represented the community for decades in challenging industry permits and advocating for
mitigation against the the petrochemical companies’ common leaks and explosions, without
much success. Even when the community won small victories over individual permits, “it was
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like playing whackamole.”28 In short, Hillcrest had seen adverse effects of development
decisions for many years, and RioGrande Legal Aid, Inc. had provided the community with
reliable advocacy for years and supporting the a core of resistance already in place. The
conversation was active, and community members were aware and opposed to the bridge
relocation before the project was even officially proposed.
When the EIS was released, community leadership assembled the Citizens Alliance for
Fairness and Progress (“The Alliance”) to focus on resisting the project. They met every week
for over a year, welcoming a diversity of perspectives and requests from the community. Many
of the older residents wanted mitigation measures to allow them to safely stay in their childhood,
and often generationsowned, homes, while the younger folks tended to want adequate relocation
benefits so they could afford housing outside of their lowcost and very polluted neighborhood.29
According to Kelly Haragan of RioGrande Legal, the Alliance advocated for all voices while
maintaining a cohesive, representative, and open organization. They “came together with a
unified voice,” and throughout the resistance, the Alliance was direct with what the community
wanted from the project. “They had a clear ask,” Haragan explained.
The mobilization’s opportunity also set them up for success. While the Alliance did a
significant amount of work towards their success, Harbor Bridge is also a great example of the
factors out of the community’s control that can also benefit the movement: the project design,
local context, and state and federal priorities all contributed to the ultimate success of the
Hillcrest opposition movement.

28
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The Harbor Bridge project was a relocation project; to remove the aesthetic disturbance
the bridge provided to downtown Corpus Christi, the project would move the bridge exit into
Hillcrest. The bridge needed rebuilding, but choosing Hillcrest couldn’t be framed as benefiting
the community since the state was choosing to take the disturbance and move it to the only
African American neighborhood in the city. There were also several other alternatives besides
the alignment through Hillcrest which TxDOT had deemed “reasonable and feasible” but
ultimately rejected, which provided leverage for the neighborhood in getting greater benefits in
return for choosing the more discriminatory option.
The local context was also conducive to success for the Alliance. The legacy of Jim
Crowera housing laws was evident in Corpus Christi, as Hillcrest was the only African
American neighborhood in the city. Their long history of environmental injustice meant
RioGrande Legal could make a case that Hillcrest was being subjected to repeated disparate
impacts. If the history of environmental hazards in a historically black neighborhood wasn’t
enough, cornering off the fourth side of their neighborhood was a direct visual indicator of
discrimination.30
Finally, the priorities of the federal administration and state government helped Hillcrest
succeed. When RioGrande Legal filed the complaint, it was met by a federal administration
receptive to environmental justice concerns. The Secretary of the United States Department of
Transportation (USDOT) at this time was an Obama appointee and had made his commitment to
environmental justice clear. Upon receiving the complaint, USDOT sent investigator Ryan
Fitzpatrick to Corpus Christi who immediately put the project on hold. With federal money on

30
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the line, TxDOT felt pressure to come to a resolution as quickly as possible. The Alliance had
rallied support from RioGrande Legal, greater Corpus Christi, and now the federal government,
leaving TxDOT to either seriously consider the requests of the Alliance or surrender the project.
In the end, TxDOT signed a resolution with USDOT agreeing on generous relocation
allowances for the community members who chose to move, and air quality mitigation efforts for
those who chose to stay. Their success is incredibly rare for resistance to freeway proposals, and
because of this Harbor Bridge provides an excellent lens through which to view the organization
and opportunity of other freeway opposition efforts.

Central 70
The case of Central 70 is important to include in this paper because held in contrast with
Harbor Bridge, it begins to unmask which factors of resistance might be more significant in the
outcome.
Background. In April 2017, the Colorado DOT (CDOT) received approval from FHWA
on a $1.7 billion project to renovate a tenmile stretch of Denver freeway. This project, called
“Central 70,” would have the most impact on the lowincome and minority neighborhoods of
ElyriaSwansea and Globeville, where the width of the freeway would be tripled, displacing
nearly 200 residents and further subjecting the community to intense air pollution among other
effects.31 The approval came after a November 2016 formal complaint with USDOT and FHWA
from EarthJustice, am environmental advocacy legal group, on behalf of several ElyriaSwansea
and Globeville neighborhood groups alleging CDOT of violating Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. Among the grievances articulated in the complaint were concerns about how public
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comments were sought out and managed (not well, they said), as well as the inadequacy of the
listed mitigation plan.32 The main mitigation measure of the project was to move the freeway
below ground through ElyriaSwansea and Globeville. CDOT would build a park on top of it,
but given the proximity to Swansea Elementary, air pollution was still an issue. The construction
of a belowgrade freeway meant that the city of Denver had to reevaluate their drainage system
(resulting in a plan called Park to Platte Hill), upsetting the African American neighborhoods of
Park Hill and City Park.33
EarthJustice also brought up concerns about unmitigated air, soil, and noise pollution
caused by the project. “Public comments repeatedly expressed concern about air quality impacts,
and advocated for the need for a comprehensive health impact assessment,” the complaint stated.
“But CDOT failed to conduct such an assessment, and, eight years after releasing the DEIS, still
has not done so.”34 The noise pollution caused by the project construction and the freeway itself
were expected to be great, and while the neighborhood of Elyria will receive a noise protection
wall, Swansea would receive no such benefit. Further, the project was predicted to disturb
underground deposits of arsenic and lead from their neighborhood ASARCO smelter, a concern
completely neglected in CDOT’s mitigation plans.35
Because displacement was necessary for the project to proceed, CDOT would be required
to compensate homeowners for their property, but CDOT calculated the value of
ElyriaSwansea’s homes based on statistics more than three years out of date. Considering that
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ElyriaSwansea already has some of the lowest property values in the area, market value for
those homes constitutes only a fraction of what it would cost to purchase a home in any other
part of Denver. In other areas of mitigation, CDOT also agreed to contribute $2 million to
affordable housing projects in the area, but compared to the $1.17 billion endeavor, their effort
was “too small a drop in too large a bucket.”36
In response to the complaint, FHWA conducted an investigation and reevaluation of the
project proposal and responded in April 2017 with a Letter of Finding picked up by the Denver
Post with the headline “Denver I70 project isn’t perfect, but it’s better for civil rights than
alternatives, feds say.”37 But a few months later in July of 2017, two lawsuits were filed against
FHWA, one claiming that a more just alternative had been wrongfully dismissed as “unrealistic”
by CDOT, and the other asserting that the project didn't comply with NEPA, evident in the
disproportionate impact on the Latinomajority neighborhoods like ElyriaSwansea.38
But neither of these lawsuits were successful in court, and CDOT successfully secured
funding for Central 70 by FHWA. The next section will look at the resistance to Central 70’s
organization and opposition on their own as well as in relation to Harbor Bridge to understand
which factors of freeway resistance might tend towards success.
Analysis. The organization of the Central 70 resistance was inferior to that of Harbor
Bridge; activism came in later and the same level of cohesion was not present. While the failure
of the opposition to Central 70 cannot be credited entirely to factors of the organization, the
actions of the community did not match up to those of Harbor Bridge activists.

36

McIntosh and Minor, “Complaint Against Colorado Department of Transportation Pursuant to Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.” 29.
37
Murray, “I70 Project in Denver Less Discriminatory than Other Options, Feds Say.” 2017.
38
Murray, “Two New Lawsuits Challenge I70 Project Ahead of Legal Deadline.” 2017.

Wampler 21

First, the timing of the opposition was too late. Groups didn't organize until the DEIS was
released in 2009, and the recent trend of gentrification39 likely divided the community’s interests.
The lack of a cohesive voice made rallying for a single cause impossible. A large portion of
ElyriaSwansea residents wanted to stay in their neighborhood (as compared to the small
percentage of the residents of Corpus Christi) which meant mitigation asks were more
complicated than a relocation allowance. Divisions also arose over the rerouting alternative and
new interest groups formed when the drainage plan mitigating for the belowgrade portion of
Central 70 would negatively impact nearby African American communities.
While aspects of the organization were certainly neglected, some aspects of their
opportunity allowed for the chance of a more hopeful outcome. Project design was not one of
them. The project was framed as helping by repairing the unsafe infrastructure that the
community was burdened with, leaving the challenge of disputing this up to the residents.40
Alternatives for freeway realignment out of ElyriaSwansea were ruled out for various reasons,
leaving the NEPA process as justification for any disparate impacts.
The local context, however, was partially on the side of the community. ElyriaSwansea,
which is 83.8% Latino,41 had a clear history of environmental hazards. The original I70 viaduct
built in the 1960s split the neighborhoods in half and the pollution caused by the freeway
resulted in severe health problems for the residents. Retired smelters left their community’s soil
contaminated with lead, resulting in a large concentration of Superfund sites in ElyriaSwansea.
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Now, their community is the “most polluted zipcode in Colorado.”42 However, local attitudes
towards the project were unfavorable for their success. With Denver potentially considering a bid
for hosting the 2030 Winter Olympics, infrastructural improvements like Central 70 were
prioritized by city and state leadership.
The state and federal government’s priorities ultimately matched the outcome of the
project. Much like Harbor Bridge, the Central 70 formal complaint to FHWA by EarthJustice
was received during the Obama administration by an agency receptive to environmental justice
issues. Like Harbor Bridge, the agency sent an investigator to Denver. However, President
Trump was elected the same month and as soon as he came to office, the community heard
progressively less from FHWA, until finally a Letter of Finding indicating the project’s approval
was released in April 2017.43
Many factors of Central 70 differentiate the project from Harbor Bridge. That said, it is
significant that Central 70 activists reached the stage of a Civil Rights investigation, only to be
stopped by a change in administrative priorities. It is impossible to claim that the outcome would
have been different had the federal priorities remained the same, but the case of Central 70–like
all of these cases–is most helpful viewed in context of the others.

South Mountain Freeway
The case of South Mountain Freeway deviates from the first two cases in terms of their
chosen method of resistance. While the activists against Harbor Bridge and Central 70 both filed
a civil rights complaint with FHWA, those working against South Mountain Freeway took a legal
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approach critiquing the state’s compliance with the NEPA process. With variables so different
from the other two cases, South Mountain Freeway provides a different perspective of the
variables which influence the outcome of a project.
Background. The South Mountain Freeway was proposed to run along the edge of
Phoenix, creating a 22mile connection between two points of the area’s ninetydegree angle
segment of I10. Planners claimed this freeway would increase mobility for residents living far
from present I10 access, improving access to employment opportunities. It would also bring
jobs to the area through an increased demand for gas stations, restaurants, and attractions along
the new route.44 The study area had a high percentage of lowincome and minority residents, but
most significantly, a majority of the proposed freeway would run along the border of the Gila
River Indian Community reservation, a sovereign nation who voted internally in support of a “no
build” alternative.45
The project was first proposed in 1983, and was partially funded by voters a couple of
years later. By 1996, however, construction was officially delayed as the voterapproved funding
from over a decade prior was now insufficient. But five years later, ADOT began the formal
NEPA process anyway and in 2004, voters passed a halfcent tax increase which in part ensured
funding of the South Mountain Freeway.46
With funding secured, ADOT proceeded with NEPA, releasing their DEIS, FEIS, and
ROD for the project in 2013, 2014, and 2015, respectively. After the release of the DEIS, the
regional chapter of the Sierra Club and one community group, Protecting Arizona's Resources
and Children (PARC), hired a local attorney to assist in providing comments to ADOT in
44
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opposition the chosen route. The Sierra Club and several other opposition groups joined forces
with PARC after the ROD was released to file a lawsuit against ADOT, first for a restraining
order to halt the project.47 At the same time, the Gila River Indian Community filed their own
lawsuit, but the courts combined the two into one case.48 When they didn't win a restraining
order, they appealed to the 9th circuit where, again, their claims lost, this time based on merit.49
With the ROD published and the courts on their side after decades of planning, funding
uncertainty, delays, and litigation, ADOT began construction on the South Mountain Freeway in
early 2017.50
Analysis. The organization, including timing and cohesion, of the resistance to the South
Mountain Freeway project was too lacking to have led to success.
First, the timing of the opposition was too late. The first signs of active, organized
opposition to the project came in 2013 with the release of the DEIS, although the regional branch
of the Sierra Club can trace their opposition to the project back to the 1980s when the idea was
first circled. Before ADOT released their DEIS for the project, they assembled a Citizens
Advisory Council to involve the community before decisions were solidified in documents, but
Sandy Bahr, Director of the Sierra Club’s Grand Canyon Chapter, and Pat Lawlis of PARC
echoed each other in feeling that the Council was only a formality so ADOT could check the
‘community outreach’ box.51 52
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Additionally, any type of cohesion was entirely absent within the movement. There were
around ten community groups opposed, all sharing their own versions of their opposition to
ADOT and the press. PARC, led by Pat Lawlis, was the lead plaintiff on the lawsuits against
FHWA that failed in district court and again in the 9th circuit. While most of the groups signed
onto the lawsuit together in support of the complaints made by PARC, there was an incredible
diversity in their goals.53 On the Gila River reservation there were ideological divisions, with
some strongly in favor of bringing the freeway onto the reservation (likely reasoning that they
would be granted more autonomy in the planning process, with an added bonus of increased
casino traffic), a few in support of ADOT’s offreservation plan, and a plurality advocating for a
nobuild alternative.54 Off reservation, PARC and other groups were opposed on the basis of air
quality, while the Phoenix Mountain Preservation Council, for example, was in the fight to
protect the mountain itself.55 These differences made it hard for the opposition to rally on behalf
of one fight, and their lack of cohesion ultimately contributed to their failure.
In terms of opportunity, community groups and national advocates alike were angered by
the outcome and felt as though their objections to the project were disregarded throughout the
planning process, NEPA, and by the legal system and state agencies later on.
The framing of the project was executed in such a way that highlighted the alleged
benefit to the community. The DEIS explains that “analytical results indicate the proposed action
would benefit all populations in the Study Area in general by reducing traffic congestion,
enhancing accessibility, and supporting local economic development plans.”56 Similar to Central
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70, the burden then fell on the community to explain the ways in which the lead agency was
incorrect in this claim. Similarly, there weren't really any reasonable and feasible alternatives to
the project, leaving ADOT with the upper hand once they had successfully argued the need for
the project at all.
In terms of local context, the history of environmental justice was not as present as it was
in the first two cases. While there is no doubt that the reservation makes the area an
environmental justice community, there is no history of severe environmental hazards focused on
the population like the residents of Hillcrest or ElyriaSwansea suffered. The lack of local
support for the opposition also fueled the project forward. Maricopa County is heavily
conservative, and while the current mayor of Phoenix is a registered democrat, his promise to
oppose the SMF at all costs when he was a city councilman went neglected when he became
mayor.57 Current and past council members, too, have dodged any accountability to help stop the
freeway.58
The state and federal context also played a role in determining the outcome of the
opposition. The history of unpredictable funding likely made finances a key stressor in the
planning process, and might explain why ADOT wanted to move as fast as possible once funding
was secured to make sure it didn't run out again. This, combined with the historically
freewaycentric vision of ADOT (“the ‘Arizona Department of Roads,’” as Bahr calls it59) set the
resistance up for the eventual failure against the South Mountain Freeway.
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Discussion
All three cases represent the diversity of variables at play in the process of resisting
freeway construction projects. Harbor Bridge is a good example of a “perfect” resistance in
terms of their organization and opportunity, but looking at the case in isolation does nothing to
tell us about trends. A departure in characteristics from this successful resistance helps us
understand which aspects and variables might matter most in the outcome. Experts closely
involved with Central 70 observed that the change in presidential administrative priorities
aligned with the project’s approval, rendering federal agency priorities the most influential in the
outcome of the resistance.
The priorities of the agency with absolute decisionmaking power in any investigation are
one of the most important factors to the outcome of the community resistance. Hillcrest’s
complaint with FHWA was met by a receptive USDOT who quickly dispatched an investigator.
Supported by a Democratic federal administration and agency, the investigator’s conclusions
ultimately resulted in a mitigation agreement supported by most. Meanwhile, Central 70’s
opposition was not nearly as lucky. In response to their Title VI complaint, FHWA sent another
investigator down to Denver, but after the change in federal administration and the leadership at
the DOT, the community stopped hearing from the investigator until the project was approved.60
The South Mountain Freeway is an excellent case to emphasize the importance of
resistance method. As Dan Sherman points out in his book Not Here, Not There, Not Anywhere:
Politics, Social Movements, and the Disposal of LowLevel Radioactive Waste, framing the
resistance as an “injustice” helps gain support for the movement because of the accusations and
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assumptions associated with the term.61 Since the South Mountain Freeway initially challenged
the NEPA process in the legal system rather than filing a Civil Rights Complaint like Harbor
Bridge and Central 70, the decisionmaking power was held by the courts. While their losses
were at the hands of the court, the supposed impartiality might indicate that perhaps the venue
pursued for opposition is just as important as the claims made against the project.
Conclusion
In this essay, I applied Charles Tilly’s framework of collective action to the politics of
freeway resistance movements to understand the characteristics of successful and unsuccessful
opposition. I found that while aspects of a group’s organizational capacity (namely their timing
and cohesion) were important to the outcome, the political opportunity available to
them–specifically the attitudes and priorities of federal government–was most critical to the
success of a movement.
Every expert I spoke to in the field had a range of critiques and suggestions for how to
ameliorate the pattern of exploitative freeways through minority neighborhoods. These, again,
fell nicely into Tilly’s framework, either addressing the barriers to better organization or barriers
to better opportunity. I will first address the barriers to opportunity (an institutional problem),
followed by a discussion of the barriers to organization (a problem with grassroots and
realworld application of theoretical knowledge) along with a sampling of the proposed
solutions.
The problem of environmental justice represents larger institutional power dynamics. For
example, using public comment as the primary (if not only) indicator of dissatisfaction among a
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community, the federal government ignores the ways that meeting times and locations, language
barriers, immigration status, and time demands might prevent residents of minority communities
from engaging with the political process. Clinton’s executive order prompted the DOT and EPA
to introduce criteria for NEPA to help lower these barriers to participation (holding meetings in
community hubs like churches, making translators available, providing documents in the
languages spoken in the community, etc.), yet there are still barriers.
To improve chances for success in freeway revolts, future institutional changes must
ensure grievances are heard, internalized, and incorporated in plans by those in power. For
example, NEPA currently doesn't allow public transit alternatives to be considered alongside
freeway alternatives in EISs. Transit options are considered “out of the scope” of freeways, even
when they address the same needs that a freeway would. Allowing, or even better–requiring,
state DOTs to incorporate transit options into their EISs might allow for better vetting of freeway
projects. A hurdle to this is the funding source, primarily since gas taxes can only be used to fund
freeway construction. If revenue from gas tax was instead allowed to finance public
transportation projects, perhaps profitable industry would form around public transportation
infrastructure in the way it has with freeways.
Another path of reform considers the legal system which prevents complaints
(specifically Title VI complaints to FHWA) from being heard. There is history of federal
agencies dismissing complaints with what appears to be limited reasoning, and further,
complainants are not permitted to appeal the decisions of civil rights complaints. Allowing Title
VI complainants to appeal a decision they feel was wrongfully made is only democratic.

Wampler 30

Another way to improve chances of success for environmental justice communities is by
addressing organizational flaws in resistance movements. Of the interviews I conducted with
activists working on Central 70 and South Mountain Freeway, most echoed feeling completely
justified in all of their organizational actions, and blamed the movement’s failure on components
of opportunity. Teaching the ways in which activists can improve is challenging because, much
like power dynamics are solidified in institutions, their habits and beliefs are ingrained.
The first area for improvement is timing. To ensure early involvement in freeway
resistance, it is imperative that neighborhoods establish a sense of community or leadership base
before a freeway is even proposed, though the methods for approaching this should be different
for every community. Second, a lack of cohesion is a major problem facing unsuccessful
resistance movements. Drawing from the Alliance against Harbor Bridge, the framing of the
opposition’s mission should be carefully considered. Finding a common enemy can aid in this
process; had the South Mountain Freeway organized the ten or so groups against the freeway
project rather than taking on niche areas to oppose perhaps they would have been more able to
organize their goals and be taken more seriously by federal agencies.

For at least the next two years, activists are left to face the least environmental
justiceconscious federal administration since Clinton acknowledged the issue of environmental
justice on a federal level.62 If federal receptiveness really is one of the keystone determinants of
success for a resistance movement, then freeways might just continue to exploit as they have for
decades. Serious pushback to instances of environmental injustice is of course still helpful.
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Media attention or nonpartisan bureaucrats in federal agencies can inspire justice, even on a
small scale or casebycase basis. Discussions of environmental and social justice continue to
raise awareness, and encouraging popular support for the movement may be what is needed to
create systemic change when political opportunity does open up. The next time the United States
has the opportunity to seriously address the problem of environmental injustice, however, it is
the responsibility of those in power to use that moment for significant growth in ethical
legislation and grassroots empowerment.
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